Differentiating Between Empirical and Preferential Decision Strategies by AlAzary, Noor
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers 
6-18-2021 
Differentiating Between Empirical and Preferential Decision 
Strategies 
Noor AlAzary 
University of Windsor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd 
Recommended Citation 
AlAzary, Noor, "Differentiating Between Empirical and Preferential Decision Strategies" (2021). Electronic 
Theses and Dissertations. 8588. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/8588 
This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor 
students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, 
in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, 
Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder 
(original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would 
require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or 
thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email 












Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies through the Department of Integrative 
Biology in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science at the 
University of Windsor 
 





















Department of Kinesiology 
 
K. Poling  
Department of Integrative Biology 
 
L. Buchanan, Advisor 




  iii 
 
Author’s Declaration Of Originality 
 
 
I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis has 
been published or submitted for publication.  
I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon anyone’s 
copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, quotations, or any 
other material from the work of other people included in my thesis, published or otherwise, are 
fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard referencing practices. Furthermore, to the 
extent that I have included copyrighted material that surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within 
the meaning of the Canada Copyright Act, I certify that I have obtained a written permission 
from the copyright owner(s) to include such material(s) in my thesis and have included copies of 
such copyright clearances to my appendix.  
I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as approved 
by my thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has not been 
submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution. 
 
  
  iv 
 
Abstract 
Visual decision-making is a common action that recruits a complex set of cognitive processes. 
When first presented with an option set from which to choose, participants can rely on one of 
two distinct decision strategies, preferential and empirical. In a preferential choice, participants 
choose their most preferred option; there is frequently a so-called gaze bias effect in such 
choices, where the gaze directed at the chosen option is longer than the gaze at unchosen options. 
In empirical choices, participants select an objectively correct choice from a set of distractors; 
these decisions have been shown to produce similar or weaker effects of the gaze bias. Although 
both forms of decision-making are the subject of scientific investigation, there are no studies that 
directly compare and contrast the two types. My project is the first to investigate the two 
decision types using a within-participants experimental design. Participants chose between 
option pairs in a 2-alternate-forced-choice task with trials grouped into 2 blocks: empirical and 
preferential. In the empirical block, option pairs contained one correct and one incorrect choice 
whereas in the preferential condition, option pairs were equal in value (i.e., no correct or 
incorrect choice). Reaction times for each choice, the number of looks, and duration of gaze for 
each option were recorded using a computer and eye tracker. To test whether the gaze bias effect 
occurs equally across these two decision types, different decision stimuli (features, math 
expressions, and words related to social biases) were used. These experiments thus help to 
differentiate between preferential and empirical decision using a novel method. Further, by 
introducing social influences in the manipulations, this research also extends our understanding 
of social influences on decision-making. 
Keywords: Decision-Making, Preference, Gaze Bias, Eye-Movements 
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Introduction 
We make hundreds of visually guided decisions every day (Wansink & Sobal, 2007). 
Although decision-making is a higher order cognitive function that recruits sensory, perception 
and action-related areas of the brain (Wang, Wang, Patel, & Patel, 2006), not all decisions are 
created equally. We know that our strategies for forming decisions are affected by previously 
established decision goals, such as the goal to be correct (accuracy) or the goal to answer as 
quickly as possible (speed) (Reddi & Carpenter, 2000). For example, we might decide what shirt 
to buy from amongst a few attractive choices or we might decide which of 4 multiple choice 
answers is the correct one for our psychology test. The former choice is a preferential one – we 
prefer the blue shirt over the white shirt – whereas the latter is an empirical one – we know 
answer B is the right one. Intuitively these two choice types feel different and they are 
considered different in the research literature.  
Visual decision-making consists of gathering information, encoding available options, 
assigning values to each option following the decision criterion, hierarchically organizing these 
options, and finally assigning and recruiting a motor-response action to the chosen option  
(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001). This cognitive approach 
to decision-making considers it a probabilistic and dynamic process, as opposed to  previous 
decision-making models that described decisions as deterministic and static (Busemeyer & 
Townsend, 1993). Earlier models, such as Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1953) classic Expected 
Utility Theory, and others that later expanded on this model (Karni, 2005; Becker, DeGroot & 
Marschak, 1963; Fishburn 1973), proposed that decision-making relies on internal preference 
formation; however, these models perpetuated the conceptual flaws relating to the main 
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assumption of decision as a fixed and binary process independent of deliberation time (Fishburn, 
1968).  
The above models come from research conducted by economists and describe the 
decisions themselves rather than decision formation. This description is partly due to the research 
goals of studying decisions in economics, where it is more important to mathematically predict 
consumer decisions rather than studying the decision as an active process. This latter objective 
evolved when psychologists began to examine how decisions are formed, and posited that 
decision makers are actively involved in the formation of choice through visual search (Green & 
Swets, 1966) rather than passively accumulating preference towards randomly viewed options.  
Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) incorporated the assumption of active processing and 
proposed that accurate modelling of a decision involves a focus on decision formation and 
introduced a cognitive approach that considers the processes of acquiring knowledge and 
understanding through thought, experience, and the senses. In this line of thinking, the process of 
decision-making involves a selection as well as the thoughts and considerations that precede that 
selection. Accordingly, Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) defines choice as 
a dynamic process that can be affected by the decision maker’s preference state as well as the 
deliberation time. Preference state is the assigned/perceived value of each option and this 
changes as a function of deliberation time. Deliberation time is the time between when an option 
set is viewed and when a choice is made; decision time is inversely related to the inhibition 
strength of a choice response, which is the ability to continue considering your options while 
simultaneously refraining from making a choice. Therefore, at the beginning of a choice process 
(t0), inhibition strength is highest. As the decision maker encodes the options and their values 
and forms a comparison between them, inhibition strength decreases. At the time of choice (t1), 
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the decision maker executes the action response related to the choice (such as reaching for the 
chosen item or pressing a button corresponding to the item), and inhibition strength has 
decreased to zero.  
To illustrate these concepts, imagine you are at a restaurant deciding between two menu 
options. At the beginning of your decision-making (t0), your inhibition from impulsively 
choosing an item is highest, allowing you to identify your options and compare the health 
benefits, taste, price and other decision criteria of each option. After some time, your preference 
towards one option increases. At the same time, you realise that your waiter is waiting on your 
choice, you are hungry and want to eat quickly, and your dinner companion wants to continue 
telling you their story. Your inhibition strength has decreased to zero and you are about to 
choose the menu item you have been eyeing. Right before you tell your waiter your order, you 
quickly realize that you eat at this restaurant all the time and always choose the same thing, so 
this time you order the other option(t1). This example highlights how in a real-world setting, 
decision-making is not always binary and static. Moreover, the act of decision-making consists 
of developing multiple sub-decisions such as how much time we allow ourselves to make 
choices and what we value most in each option. Modern theories of decision-making include 
consideration of such sub-decisions. 
The Involvement of Eye Movement 
Although uncertainty is ubiquitous in the processes relating to decision (Shafir & 
Tversky, 1992), researchers examine whether common strategies exist in visual decision-making. 
As decision makers, we routinely seek information through eye movement, comparing visible 
options relative to one another (Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013; Gwizdka & Zhang, 2015). These 
eye movements are task dependent (Yarbus, 1967) with specific gaze patterns (Mourant, & 
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Rockwell, 1970; Walker-Smith, Gale & Findlay, 1977) that researchers can capitalize upon by 
using multimethod approaches to investigate decision processes.For example, behavioural 
responses (i.e., visual information scanning) made prior to decisions provide insight about the 
underlying cognitive processes (i.e., sub-decisions) that generate responses (Glaholt & Reingold, 
2011; Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013).  
The above approach, known as process tracing, involves analyzing participants’ 
responses and their preceding eye movements or other concurrent behavioural processes 
involving attention. To monitor eye movements, an eye-tracker is used and the location and 
duration of eye gaze are analyzed by researchers. The eye-tracker records fixations, which are 
brief moments of time lasting at least 250 milliseconds when eye gaze is directed towards a 
specific location; researchers assume that visual information encoding is most likely to take 
place during fixations (Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000).  
All choices, according to early economics theorists, depend on an internally derived 
preference state (Fishburn, 1968). The methods for measuring internal preference state are 
divided in two types: stated and revealed (Timmermans, Molin, & Van Noortwijk, 1994; 
Adamowicz, Louviere, & Williams, 1994). Stated preference refers to hypothetical situations in 
which the subject assigns values to independent choices based on the utility of each item as a set 
of defined pros and cons. Revealed preference refers to the subject choosing one item over 
another. This analysis assumes that the choices made by participants disclose their hidden 
preference (Sen, 1971). In the context of cognitive research on preference, researchers 
investigate revealed preference by asking participants to choose one option based on their 
personal preference or propensity (Wang & Ruhe, 2007), and all options are virtually equal at the 
beginning of any given trial (Sen, 1971).  
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In contrast to preferential decision making, an empirical decision-making strategy is 
assumed to be perceptually driven with criteria based on previous knowledge and weighted 
values of the stimuli (Wang & Ruhe, 2007). For example, a large proportion of memory research 
is structured in a way that requires the subject to view a stimulus and then make decisions (i.e., 
did you see this item in a previously viewed list) by completing an action (pressing a key, 
selecting an option, etc.); an accuracy score of a participant’s decision-making process is used 
for measuring memory (Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000). Rather than choosing what is most 
appealing as in a preferential choice, decision makers guided by empirical strategies follow the 
goal of choosing the correct answer. Further, rather than passively ignoring the unchosen option 
in preferential choice, data from search tasks indicate that non-targets viewed prior to target 
stimuli result in an interference effect (Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994). Thus, these empirical 
decision processes may differ from preferential choice in that decision makers actively “filter” 
options by eliminating the incorrect ones. Such filtering has been argued to be revealed in dwell 
time data (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009a, 2009b, 2011; Schotter et al., 2010). Dwell time refers to 
the amount of time (usually measured in milliseconds) that eyes are fixated on a specified 
location. Proportional dwell time can be calculated as a percentage by dividing the total time 
spent dwelling on an option by the total time spent dwelling on an entire visual array or scene. In 
this way, options can be comparatively analyzed based on the duration of a participant’s gaze.  
Table 1 summarizes the various differences between empirical and preferential decision 
strategies. One commonality between classical decision-making methods and contemporary 
analysis of decision is that both have previously been used to passively measure post-choice 
behavioural data (Response time, Accuracy scores). One contrast is that decision-making 
research has reoriented this method towards the collection of cognitive process data that takes 
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place before response-related decisions and during decision formation. In joining these two 
methods together, contemporary research (Lohse & Johnson, 1996) during decision-making 
(Mackenzie, Glaholt & Reingold, 2011) uses analyzed behavioural responses concurrently with 
pre-decision behaviour data to provide a general framework of visual decision-making processes. 
By so doing, decision formation can be more accurately investigated in a way that takes into 
account the conceptual differences outlined in Table 1.  
The elucidation of the differences between these two decision types and a comparative 
investigation of their unique mechanisms remain outstanding lacuna in the study of decision-
making. As noted, preferential choice has no wrong answer, option sets are equal upon 
presentation, and the goal is to choose what is most liked (Fischhoff, 2005). Conversely, 
empirical choice has a correct answer among incorrect options and the goal is to choose the right 
answer (Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981). Additionally, the process of elimination, in which 
the participant filters unchosen from chosen options, differs among these two types (Onuma, 
Penwannakul, Fuchimoto, & Sakai, 2017; Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). When 
making a choice based on preference, elimination would involve actively looking towards the 
preferred option and passively disregarding unappealing options. Following the earlier example 
of choosing what to wear, one would be drawn to the aesthetically pleasing sweater while 
ignoring other options (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003; Glaholt & Reingold, 
2009a). However, during empirical decision in which the decision criterion guides the final 
choice, it is expected that each option is scanned and then processed as either correct or incorrect 
(Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). When answering a multiple-choice question, the decision rationale 
would more closely follow previous study material and involve more active scanning and 
filtering of each option into a hierarchy (A is incorrect, B may be partially correct, C seems the 
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most correct, D is very incorrect). Although these assumptions seem commonsensical, they have 
not yet been experimentally tested.  
Additionally, because preferential choices have no wrong answer, choices are 
comparably inconsistent (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) whereas in empirical choices we 
would expect to observe greater consistency because participants are making judgements based 
on shared decision goals. This difference may not be revealed by the gaze patterns of these two 
decision strategies but may be noteworthy when analyzing the variability of the decision 
responses between participants.  
Finally, these two decision types vary in their proportion of risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 
2013) due in part to the assumption that preference formation involves risk aversion (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 2013). Due to the time limitations of this research project, risk was not 
experimentally tested. However, it is worth going over a brief description of the nature of risk 
because of how universal both risk and uncertainty are in decision research.  
Although there are varying definitions of risk depending upon the field of study (Yang & 
Qiu, 2005), decision analysts interested in preference and uncertainty define risk as the 
subjective and probabilistic perception associated with an individual’s preference or the 
possibility of the decision maker choosing an unfavourable outcome (Yang & Qiu, 2005). 
Further, risk is thought to depend on two concepts: uncertainty and preference state. Yang and 
Qiu (2005) assume that uncertainty and risk are positively correlated, and preference (also 
known as expected utility) is negatively correlated with risk. Preference towards a decision is 
increased in a preference task, but uncertainty stays the same. This is because this decision type 
is subjective, with risks undefined. However, in empirical decisions, as one scans options 
looking for the “correct” answer (knowing that there is one), risk has a defined parameter. 
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Preference and response are linked during empirical choice since the decision maker has a goal 
of selecting a correct answer. Therefore, empirical decisions are perceived as comparatively 
riskier than preferential decision-making simply because there exists a chance of being incorrect.  
Although there is no single behavioural measure of risk, researchers have attempted to 
quantify this concept in a number of ways (Yang & Qiu, 2005; Jia & Dyer, 1996; Fiedler & 
Glöckner, 2012). One way is by using pupil dilation as a measure of risk, based upon previous 
evidence of a relationship between pupil dilation and noradrenaline (Preuschoff, Marius, 
Einhäuser, & Nieuwenhuis, 2011). However, pupil dilation has also been correlated with task 
difficulty (Brunyé et al., 2016) and “arousal” during cognitive tasks (Recarte, Pérez, Conchillo, 
& Nunes, 2008), making it unclear if pupil dilation measures any one isolated component of 
decision-making. Another proposed method of investigating decision under risk is using relative 
risk aversion (Dyer & Sarin, 1982). Using this method, participants are assigned risk attitudes 
(risk-aversive or risk-taking) based on their decision between choices that offer a guarantee and 
those with manipulated probabilities of gaining or losing different reward values (Dyer & Sarin, 
1982). In this way, risk is categorically defined by choice rather than scalarly defined by 
behaviour (Preuschoff et al., 2011). Following this idea, empirical decision-making (which risks 
a correct answer with an incorrect answer) inherently holds an additional dimension of risk over 
subjective preferential decision-making.  
 
Table 1 
Differences Between Preferential & Empirical Decision Strategies 
Decision Type Preferential Empirical 
Option values at beginning of trial Equal Unequal 
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Decision Criterion Choose most preferred Choose correct answer 
Choice Elimination Passively ignore disliked 
options 
Actively view & mark options as 
correct/incorrect 
Choice Scores None  1 correct answer 
Individual Differences Based on personal 
preference 
Based on correct answer 
Uncertainty/Risk Undefined Defined 
 
A Review of Visual Decision 
Gaze Bias 
Although both preferential and empirical decision strategies are researched within the 
context of visual decision-making, these strategies are used to study independent processes 
within largely independent fields. Preferential decision strategies are employed in economics 
studies to measure buyer behaviour (Carrigan et al, 2005; Lee, Lerohl & Unterschultz, 2000; 
Jarvis, Rungie & Lockshin, 2007; Scarpa et al., 2003), and empirical decision strategies are used 
in memory and language studies to measure accuracy or “forgetting” (For example: Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996; Thomas & Diener, 1990; Watson, Bunting, Poole & Conway, 2005). There are 
no known experiments that directly compare the two types of decisions.  
To date, research on gaze duration (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009a, 2009b, 2011; Shimojo, 
Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003), fixation number (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009b; Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2011), response time (Shimojo et al., 2003) and even pupil dilation (Braun, Urai, & 
Donner, 2017; de Gee, Knapen, & Donner, 2013; Einhäuser, 2010; Preuschoff et al., 2011; 
Simpson & Hale, 1969) have been used as behavioural measures of cognitive processing during 
visual decision tasks. An additional analysis of decision involves comparing these variables at 
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the trial level between chosen and unchosen option (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009a; Shimojo et al., 
2003) where a gaze bias effect (GBE) was first revealed during preferential decision-making. 
This effect shows a longer time is spent looking at the ultimately chosen option when compared 
to unchosen options (Shimojo et al., 2003). This effect has been replicated with 2-Alternate 
Forced Choice (2-AFC) tasks of faces (Shimojo et al., 2003), non-face novel stimuli (Schotter, 
Berry, McKenzie, & Rayner, 2010; Shimojo et al., 2003), and 8-AFCs of scenes/art images 
(Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). In these studies, participants were asked to choose their most 
preferred option. In contrast, in studies where participants were asked to choose their most 
disliked option, the gaze bias effect was not revealed (Schotter, Berry, McKenzie, & Rayner, 
2010) and longer gaze duration was toward unchosen options. This evidence suggests that 
looking behaviour itself, but not selection, may be guided by preference. If selection were guided 
by preference, the results would show a gaze bias towards any chosen option regardless of the 
task (preference vs. dislike). However, this is not the case, as preferred options were gazed at 
longer independent of whether they were chosen or not.  
The GBE was first observed by Shimojo and colleagues (2003), where the main goal of 
their experiment was to investigate the role of orienting behaviour, or “gazing” on preference 
formation. Their reasoning was that if emotions operate along approach/aversion principles, then 
these principles would be revealed behaviourally through gaze direction and duration in an 
emotion-based preference task. Specifically, Shimojo and his colleagues hypothesized that 
orienting behaviour plays an active role in directing passive visual processes (such as direction of 
eye movement & foveation) towards the chosen space for attention allocation (Shimojo et al., 
2003). Participants were asked to view pairs of faces and respond by choosing one face using a 
keyboard button press. While participants viewed the option pairs, their eye movements were 
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recorded until they responded. Upon response, the face pair disappeared, and the next trial would 
begin. Five separate tasks were organized such that for each task, 5 participants made decisions 
about Face-attractiveness-difficult (FAD), Face-attractiveness-easy (FAE), Face-dislike (FD), 
Face-roundness (FR) or Fourier-descriptor-attractiveness (FDA). For the first four tasks (FAD, 
FAE, FD, FR), face stimuli were first rated by 12 (different) participants for attractiveness using 
a 1-7-point Likert scale. Then, averages for each face were calculated and paired based on their 
similarity in attractiveness (for the FAD, FD & FR tasks) or based on their dissimilarity in 
attractiveness (FAE task). Faces that were dissimilar were considered to be less difficult due to a 
more noticeable contrast between the option pair (FAE), whereas a pair of faces very similar in 
attractiveness ratings depict a less-noticeable contrast and would therefore be perceived as more 
difficult to choose between (FAD). The instructions for the FAD and FAE tasks were identical, 
participants were asked to choose the most attractive face. In the FD task, participants were 
instead asked to choose their most disliked face. In the FR task, participants were instructed to 
choose the most round looking face. Finally, in the FDA task, pairs of unrated and novel abstract 
shapes created by a Fourier-descriptor algorithm were presented to participants who were asked 
to choose the more attractive shape. These tasks (FR and FDA) were used to control for selection 
bias or memorization of response, by comparing Face-like task results to results that involve 
judging non-face stimuli and roundness. For each task, the last 1.67 seconds (i.e., the last 50 data 
points from each trial) before response time (RT) were analyzed using Gaze likelihood analyses. 
Results were graphed as time until decision (in seconds) by the likelihood that the chosen option 
was inspected. Using time until decision and the likelihood of a chosen option being inspected, 
all  graphs corresponding to the preference tasks began at chance level probability (50%) and 
rose to over chance level, regardless of task or stimuli. The FAD task showed the greatest 
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increase of probability, up to 83%. In other words, in all like-tasks, participants would begin 
trials by looking at the chosen option in equal proportion to the unchosen option, but increased 
their gaze towards the eventually chosen option (Shimojo et al., 2003).  
Shimojo and colleagues (2003) suggested their findings were due to a positive feedback 
loop (gaze cascade hypothesis), consisting  of orienting eye movements and increasing 
preference. In any given preference choice, participants will probabilistically look at one option, 
assign a preference value to that option, look at the other option, assign a preference value to that 
option, and continuously increase the gaze duration towards the option with the higher 
preference value thereby increasing this preference value (Shimojo et al., 2003). From a 
generalized viewpoint of how visual system scanning is modelled, this argument is congruent 
with Clark’s (2012; 2015) description of the mind as a “prediction engine” rather than a passive 
system that accumulates bottom-up processes. Instead, in this view, the mind stores an internal 
expectation of incoming sensory information and compares its model with actual feedback. 
When this comparison is incorrect, a non-zero value, called a prediction error is encoded. This 
mechanism is comprised of bidirectional crosstalk between deep and superficial neural cells 
(Clark, 2012, 2015). Two real examples of the visual system are used as evidence of neural 
activity functioning as error predictors. The first example of biphasic neurons within the lateral 
geniculate nucleus, V1, and the middle temporal area that respond to opposing stimulus patterns 
rather than one stimulus type, highlights the concept of bidirectional crosstalk (Jehee & Ballard, 
2009). Secondly, surround suppression activity of neurons takes place when the relative rate of 
neuronal firing increases when the orientation of the stimulus is orthogonal to a surrounding 
stimulus and decreases when the central stimulus is parallel to the surroundings (Rao & 
Sejnowski, 2002). Both instances are accounted for in the generative model of predictive 
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processing since neural activity increases in response to incongruent features (Friston & Kiebel, 
2009). These findings are also congruent with Shimojo and colleagues’ findings of FAD task 
showing longer GBE than FAE. Recall that the difference between face pairs is greater in the 
easy condition than in the difficult condition, which may account for increased neural activity in 
the easy condition, resulting in less need for a positive feedback loop (Shimojo et al., 2003). 
Further, the FAD condition revealed longer mean RT (3.55s+/- 0.18) than the FAE condition 
(3.05s+/- 0.12) (Shimojo et al., 2003), suggesting that more time is needed to build an internal 
preference towards the chosen option when central stimuli are comparatively similar than when 
contrasting pairs are viewed and judged.  
One limitation of Shimojo & colleagues’ gaze bias experiment (2003) is that it measures 
the GBE in a probabilistic way and therefore dwell duration (the length of time an item is looked 
at) and dwell count (the number of times an item is looked at) are collapsed into one variable. 
However, these two variables may mean different things and it has been theorized that decision-
making involves two inter-dependent processes (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Onuma et al., 2017; 
Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013; Schotter et al., 2010). One process is option set encoding 
(Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). This early encoding involves bottom-up processing, in which a 
subject receives incoming information that is stored in the working memory during the decision 
process. After early encoding, the second process activates, which is the evaluation of the 
options (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011), through the top-down processing that is required for a final 
decision. Top-down processing uses the information gathered from early encoding to form a 
judgement of which option will be selected based on the decision criterion. After this judgement 
is assigned, the decision maker will then assign and initiate a motor action that corresponds to 
the chosen option. This is important because decision-making is regarded as a probabilistic 
  14 
 
process of information search, but researchers can attempt to analyze both encoding and 
evaluative processes individually. For example, Glaholt and Reingold (2011) additionally 
suggested that dwell duration reflects the primary selective encoding process of decision-
making, whereas dwell count reflects the process of comparing options.  
To expand on the concept of the GBE and implement a novel method of process tracing, 
Glaholt and Reingold (2009a, 2009b, 2011) tested the gaze cascade effect proposed by Shimojo 
et al. (2003). They argued that prior models of decision research, which focused on predicting 
decision based on responses, lacked the necessary measures for identifying the different stages of 
decision-making; the introduction of eye-tracking measures would bridge the gap between 
generalized decision research and specific stages of cognitive processing.  
The above speculation came from multiple studies that measured both dwell duration and 
number of dwells in 8-AFC decision-making tasks with both preference and non-preference 
instructions (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009a, 2009b, 2011). Glaholt and Reingold (2009a, 2009b, 
2011) replicated the GBE in all of their studies, but their analyses of both gaze duration and 
dwell count conflicted with the gaze cascade (GC) hypothesis. The GC hypothesis proposes an 
explanation for the GBE by asserting that eye movement operates on a positive feedback loop of 
increasing towards the favored option while simultaneously favoring the option being examined. 
More specifically, the positive feedback loop consists of two effects: mere exposure effect and 
familiarity effect. Glaholt and Reingold (2009b) reasoned that if the GBE primarily operated 
along these effects, then a manipulation in the exposure of certain options would produce a 
longer gaze bias towards those options. When certain options were pre-exposed, the gaze bias of 
chosen options was smaller than those of unchosen options (Glaholt and Reingold, 2009b, 2011). 
As well, the bias in dwell frequency was unaffected by the exposure manipulation. The pattern of 
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gaze bias in both the preference and non-preference instruction conditions were also found to be 
extremely similar.  
Glaholt and Reingold’s (2009a, 2009b, 2011) work on gaze bias introduced several 
noteworthy considerations. Firstly, the GBE can be analyzed in a number of ways: the duration 
of dwells, the number of dwells, and even the average dwell duration of chosen/unchosen items 
all contribute to the overall gaze bias effect. Secondly, the GBE is present in both preferential 
and non-preferential decision tasks (Mitsuda & Glaholt, 2014), and is independent of the 
exposure effect. These findings directly contradict Shimojo and colleagues’ gaze cascade 
hypothesis which assumes that GB operates along an emotion-contingent, approach/avoidance 
mechanism. Since the GBE is replicated outside of preference tasks, cognitive researchers have a 
basis for using this effect and its constituents (dwell duration, frequency, average) to measure 
and analyze the cognitive components of decision formation.  
To elucidate the differences between decision types, it is necessary to understand the 
current framework of the general decision-making process. Making a decision of a 2-option pair 
begins with viewing one option out of a set and encoding it into working memory and then doing 
the same with the second option. Once both pairs are encoded, a perceptual comparison of the 
pair is made and one option is selected. To choose one option out of a group involves assigning it 
to a corresponding action. For example, in a perceptual decision-making task where one option is 
on the right side of the trial window and the other is on the left side, participants will press a 
button on a keyboard corresponding to each option. For an empirical decision, the process of 
comparison involves assigning one option that corresponds to the decision criterion. In contrast, 
when participants are asked to make a choice based on preference (or when option pairs are 
equal in value), one can expect that the comparison process involves scanning options multiple 
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times until the preference of one option reaches a decision threshold; then a decision-related 
action is assigned and carried out. This expectation is congruent with Shimojo and colleagues’ 
(2003) hypothesis of the gaze cascade effect, where a positive feedback loop initiates an increase 
in gaze duration towards the chosen option.  
It is unknown whether this effect extends to empirical decision-making. Although no 
known experiment has investigated the effects of accuracy based perceptual decision on gaze 
bias using the same stimulus set, one recent experiment (Onuma et al., 2017) coupled a 
preference task with other perceptual decision-making tasks. Researchers asked participants to 
judge between faces and images based on preference, roundness and brightness in separate 
blocks and analyzed the effect of first and second looks on each item and subsequent gaze bias. 
The researchers hypothesized that the second look would have a longer gaze duration than the 
first because it would consist of encoding and comparison of option pairs whereas the first look 
would only consist of information encoding. They did indeed observe that the second look 
contributed more to the gaze bias than the first look; this effect was longer in the preference 
block than the perceptual decision block (roundness). Results were analyzed in this way to 
determine if the GBE was merely due to the probability of which item was looked at first. These 
observations suggested that information encoding of both options contributed to gaze bias rather 
than the item viewed first as being favoured and looked at longer. Although the GBE was 
revealed in both tasks, these tasks were only distinguished by asking the participant to make 
judgements based on them and not by altering stimulus roundness/brightness in a way that could 
lead to empirical choices or be measured as accuracy scores. Therefore, the similar results may 
be due to similar decision-making strategies.  
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Another experiment by Schotter, Berry, McKenzie, and Rayner (2010) coupled 
like/dislike tasks with an accuracy based perceptual decision task. Participants were asked to 
either rate pairs of photographs (of scenes, portraits, landscapes and animals) as more liked, 
disliked, older or newer. In the older/newer task, participants viewed two photographs, either 
both were in colour, black- and-white, or one coloured and one black-and-white. Results 
revealed a GBE in the Like task but not in the Dislike task. Even more interesting was the 
observation of a GBE, though not as strongly as in the like task, in the Older/Newer tasks. These 
results provide additional evidence that the GBE is a salient effect of decision-making, which 
may be reinforced by liking effects, but is also a baseline behaviour of the selective encoding and 
evaluation processes. Although the Older/Newer task provides a better method for testing 
perceptual decision, the difference in colour may be a confound that affects eye gaze. Therefore, 
a more robust method of testing GBE on perceptual decision would involve stimulus sets that do 
not differ visually (by brightness or colour), and instead differ by the information they encode.  
The present experiments serve to bridge this gap by manipulating the perceptual decision 
task by presenting unequal option sets. This would more closely match the accuracy-based task 
style used in memory studies and would prevent participants from passively forming a 
preferential decision strategy. This would also potentially provide a more accurate observation of 
an empirical decision strategy including accuracy scores as a variable. Onuma et al. (2017) 
counterbalanced the preference and perceptual choice blocks, which may have led to preference 
decision strategies to carry through to perceptual decision when presented in that order. 
Additionally, the researchers informed participants of when to choose based on preference and 
when to choose based on brightness/roundness. Therefore, the effects revealed may have been 
due to task instruction and not necessarily reflect how decision strategies are altered outside of 
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an experimental context. To further prevent preferential decision strategy carry-over effects and 
increase potential external validity, the empirical block will be presented prior to the preference 
block in order to switch participants from an accuracy-based decision strategy to a preference-
based strategy without the use of added instruction.  
Reaction Time 
 As previously mentioned, Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) maintain that the 
deliberation time provides further insight to the process of decision formation. Decision is 
established as a dynamic, stochastic process which innately involves assigning a time limit to 
decision, in which a pattern can be revealed from the time at which a subject visually scans an 
option set until the time of decision response (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). As well, in the field of 
cognitive research, reaction time (RT) is used as a variable for measuring processing speed, or 
the rate at which information is encoded. When considering decision formation as a process of 
information encoding as well as option comparison, reaction time offers a measure for the time 
course allotted to each response. Standardizing reaction time as a variable for measuring 
decision-making is not only valuable to the entire field of decision-making from a cognitive 
approach, but to this specific research project. Following Shimojo and colleagues’ 2003 
experiment, face pairs that were highly similar in preference ratings revealed RTs that were on 
average 460ms longer than face pairs that were dissimilar in preference ratings. This is congruent 
with prior findings that response time increases as a function of decreasing discriminability 
(Verghese, 2001; Palmer & Wright, 1998; Palmer & Mclean, 1995). Thus, the use of reaction 
time as a metric of decision formation provides insight into the time course of the detection and 
application of discriminating features between an option set.  
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To further and more reliably establish characteristic similarities and differences between 
these decision-making types, reaction time will act as a secondary variable of interest, as it is 
unknown how these decision strategies differ with respect to reaction time. Reaction time 
measures the time it takes for a subject to detect, process, and respond to a stimulus. Due to 
differing methods and stimulus sets used in independent studies, it is unknown how reaction time 
differs by decision type if one were to use an identical stimulus set in the same experiment with 
the same subject. This difference in reaction time may also coincide with the gaze bias effect and 
further provide descriptive data for each decision type. If gaze bias is related to the selective 
encoding process argued by Schotter and colleagues in 2010, then one would expect the reaction 
times of the empirical block, where subject responses depend on finding an inequality between 
option pairs, to be shorter than the preferential block, where participants encode option pairs as 
being equal and therefore cannot selectively encode a correct response and assign a 
corresponding button press.  
The primary research goal of this thesis is to characterize the behavioural similarities and 
differences of preferential and empirical decision-making strategies. Specifically, what are the 
behavioural differences between each decision strategy? To what extent is the gaze bias revealed 
in each decision strategy? And what is the difference in proportion of mental effort or attention 
allocation between these two strategies? Investigating each question involves a different variable 
that has to do with a different aspect of decision-making. Reaction time has to do with the speed 
at which selective encoding occurs and gaze bias relates to the specific choice. Therefore, 
analyzing these two variables provides an integrative approach to analyzing decision strategies as 
behaviourally distinct categories when task, stimulus set, and subject remain constant.  
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The findings of this research would potentially inform design considerations in media 
presentation, marketing, advertising, policymaking, and survey-creation considering that eye 
movements play an important role in decision-making. Knowledge of different decision 
strategies may provide insight for presentation development to appropriately frame information 
designed for consumption (presented facts or statements) and information seeking interactions 
(presented questions or options).  
Methods 
Participants 
Forty undergraduate participants aged 17 years or older with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision were recruited through the University of Windsor Participant Pool for each 
experiment (120 participants total). Participants signed a consent form indicating the nature of 
the task prior to the experiment and received partial course credit as compensation. Table 2 
summarizes reported demographics of participant age and gender by the University of Windsor 
Participant Pool pre-screening questionnaire database as percentages.  
Table 2.  
Average gender and age demographics of participants that completed one of three studies. 






Age Range  
17-20 56 











Eye movements were tracked and recorded via an SR Eyelink 1000 Plus eye-tracker. 
Trials were presented via a 30 x 37.6 cm Dell computer monitor screen with a display resolution 
of 1024 x 768 pixels. Participant responses were reported with the left and right “Alt” keys on a 
computer keyboard. Eye movement recordings were measured from the participant’s right eye, 
the distance of the eye to the top and bottom of the viewable portion of the screen were 720mm 
and 765mm, respectively. The experiment was run using ExperimentBuilder software and data 
was accessed with Eyelink Data Viewer and Excel.  
 
Stimuli and Design  
Three studies, each consisting of a 2-Alternate Forced Choice (2-AFC) task with different 
stimulus sets were conducted. Each experiment consisted of two blocks: the empirical block 
(options differed in value by either one or two features) and the preferential block (options were 
equal or neutral). In each block, trials were randomized. For Experiment 1, all stimuli were hand-
drawn using a Wacom drawing tablet and GIMP 2 software. The stimulus set consisted of 66 
trials (45 empirical and 21 preferential) (See Appendix A for trial examples). Experiment 2 had 
60 trials of simple math expressions (30 empirical and 30 preferential) (See Appendix B for trial 
example). Experiment 3 had 48 trials consisting of pairs of words derived from a latent semantic 
analysis of gender stereotyped words in American English (Lenton, Sedikides, & Bruder, 2009) 
(See Appendix C). Word pairs were either traits or roles and were paired as male-female (ex. 
Mechanic-Nurse) or neutral-neutral (ex. Attendant-Cashier). The first block consisted of 24 trials 
of male-female pairs (12 roles, 12 traits) and the second block consisted of 24 trials of neutral-
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neutral pairs of traits and roles. Words were positioned on the left and right sides of the computer 
screen. 40 participants completed 3 practice trials before moving onto each experiment’s test 
trials. Before every trial, participants were directed to stare at a centered fixation point to control 
for pre-trial gaze position.  
 
Feature Inequality Task 
In Experiment 1, three pairs of features (i.e. Shape-circle vs. triangle, Colour-red vs. 
green, Line Orientation-horizontal vs. vertical) were presented visually as inequality rules before 
the experiment begins. Participants were also able to view the rules prior to each trial (See 
Appendix A- Trial Rules and Option Stimulus). Trial stimuli were composed of two image pairs, 
each being a combination of two features shown in the inequality rules. To control for position 
preference, the pairs were counterbalanced into two lists which alternate equally between 
participants. Participants were prompted on-screen to either view the rules by pressing the 
Spacebar key or to continue to the next trial by pressing any “Alt” key (see Appendix A). 
 
Math Inequality Task  
In Experiment 2, trial stimuli were composed of a pair of simple addition expressions (ex. 
1+4 vs. 3+3; 1+3 vs. 2+0). The empirical block had 30 trials in which an option pair had one 
summed expression as higher in value than another, by either 1 or 2 units. The preferential block 
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Trait/Role Stereotype Task  
In Experiment 3, a sentence prime preceded each trial for 5 seconds (See Appendix C). Each 
sentence stem was gendered, either as “He/She…” or “The man/woman…” and described a trait 
(ex. “…was being…” gendered trial: dominant [masculine] vs. affectionate [feminine], neutral 
trial: conscientious vs ridiculous) or (ex. “…worked as a…” gendered trial: machinist 
[masculine] vs. florist [feminine], neutral trial: mentor vs. assistant) role . The next screen 
presented a word pair. Participants were asked to complete the sentence stem by choosing one of 
the two words in the pair.  
 
Procedure  
After the researcher described the nature of the task and informed consent was provided 
by the participant, the participant was seated at a Windows XP computer running both 
ExperimentBuilder software and an EyeLink SR 1000 eye-tracker. The participant had their right 
eye calibrated with the eye-tracker. Calibration involved a 9-point on-screen calibration phase in 
which the participant focused their gaze on fixation points on screen in 9 locations. After 
calibration, participants viewed the task instructions on-screen on a computer. Participants were 
read the instructions by the researcher. A fixation point was presented in the middle of the 
screen, and participants were instructed to fixate eye movement onto the fixation point. This was 
done to ensure all participants began trials with their eyes fixated in the same central, neutral 
area prior to data collection. This method also corrected for small drifts in the calculation of gaze 
position for subsequent data analysis. Following drift correction, participants were presented 
with a pair of stimuli corresponding to the task on-screen and were asked to choose one of the 
two options as the correct answer based on each experiment’s instructions by pressing the 
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corresponding “Alt” key. If the left image was chosen, participants were instructed to press the 
left “Alt” key and if the right image was chosen, participants were instructed to press the right 
“Alt” key. Prior to beginning each experiment, participants completed a practice session 
involving trials from both blocks to ensure their comprehension of the task instructions.  
 
Data Analysis 
Participant data was first opened using the EyeLink DataViewer software. Interest area 
reports were obtained in excel file format. Practice trials were omitted from the reports and only 
test trials were used for data analysis. Trials which had participants look at only one option or 
neither option were omitted from the dataset for analysis.  
For each empirical block of each experiment, results were further subdivided into 
correct/incorrect responses and an average accuracy score was obtained for empirical blocks of 
Experiments 1 and 2. This was done to ensure participants understood task instructions and to 
control for guessing. Only correct trials were analyzed for the remaining analyses of proportional 
dwell time, reaction time and number of fixations.  
For gaze bias analysis, choice responses were re-coded to reflect which option within a 
trial was chosen (and which was unchosen). The proportion of time spent looking at each option 
was compared between the dwell times (in milliseconds) of chosen options and the dwell times 
of unchosen options (in milliseconds). Proportional dwell time was calculated as a percentage by 
dividing the total dwell time by each option dwell time (chosen/unchosen). These values were 
analyzed using a 2X2 repeated-measures ANOVA for dwell time and number of fixations and a 
Paired Sample T-Test for reaction time in each experiment. Experiments 1 and 2 were compared 
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using a 2X2X2 repeated-measures ANOVA with block (2 factors: empirical, preferential) and 
choice (2 factors: chosen, unchosen) for each dependent variable.  
 
Results & Discussion 
Data Cleanup 
Trials in which the participant had not looked at one or both option values were excluded 
from all three experimental datasets. Experiment 1 included 2640 trials in the raw dataset. 376 
trials (14.2%) contained zero values for either one or both of the option dwell time data and were 
omitted. Of the remaining 2,264 trials, 742 were preferential trials and 1,522 were empirical 
trials1. Experiment 2 included 2,400 trials in the raw dataset. 122 trials (5.1%) contained zero 
values for either one or both of the option dwell time data and were omitted. Of the remaining 
2,278 trials, 1,112 were preferential trials and 1,165 were empirical trials. Experiment 3 included 
1,920 trials in the raw dataset. 195 trials (10.2%) contained zero values for either one or both of 
the option dwell time data and were omitted. Of the remaining 1,725 trials, 875 were gender 
biased trials and 850 were gender neutral trials. One participant’s data contained zero values for 
all trials and was therefore omitted from Experiment 3’s analysis.  
 
Accuracy Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2 
To ensure participants understood the instructions of Experiments 1 and 2, accuracy of 
the empirical blocks was examined and compared between studies. Participants responded 
correctly in 1,352 trials (88.9%) in Experiment 1 and in 1,143 trials (98.2%) in Experiment 2. A 
 
1 This imbalance in trials between blocks reflects the unequal number of cases in the experimental conditions 
rather than a disparity in difficulty. In other words, the possible combinations of paired options in the empirical 
block outnumbered the possible combinations of pairs in the preferential block.  
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comparison between scores was conducted by a repeated-measures ANOVA. A main effect of 
accuracy was obtained, F(1,39) = 27.945, p = < .001, ƞ2 = 0.417. Pairwise comparisons indicate 
that Experiment 2 resulted in greater accuracy scores (M = 0.981, SE = 0.003) than Experiment 1 
(M = 0.882, SE = 0.017). 
Comparatively, Experiment 1 appears to be more difficult than Experiment 2, as accuracy scores 
between each experiment varied by 10%. This difference in difficulty may have been due to the 
more complex nature of the task in Experiment 1. Participants had to keep the relative values of 
each rule in their working memory as they applied them to each option, extending their working 
memory to maintain the values of each option for their consequent decision response. In contrast, 
Experiment 2 involved computing visible numeric values and simply comparing their sums, a 
fairly simple task which does not recruit working memory for information beyond the presented 
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 These results indicate that participants understood the task instructions and were 




Dwell Time Analysis 
 To investigate possible gaze bias between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and 
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted in which proportional dwell time (as a percentage) was the dependent variable. A 
main effect of block was obtained F(1,39) = 5.413, p = .025, ƞ2 = 0.022. The preferential block 
(M = 0.421, S.E. = 0.005) resulted in longer dwell time than the empirical block (M = 0.410, S.E. 
= 0.005). There was no main effect of choice. 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1 mean proportional dwell time of options grouped by block and choice. 
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RT Analysis 
 A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was conducted revealing that the dataset was not normally 
distributed in either empirical, W(40) = 0.899, p = 0.002, nor preferential, W(40) = 0.783, p < 
0.001, trials. Empirical trials had a skewness of 1.13 (S.E. = 0.37) and a kurtosis of 0.84 (S.E. = 
0.73). Preferential trials had a skewness of 2.02 (S.E. = 0.37) and a kurtosis of 4.33 (S.E. = 0.73). 
A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was conducted Z = 104.00, p < .001, which indicated that the RT  
was longer in the preferential block (M = 3664.463, S.E. = 358.834) than in the empirical block 
(M = 2270.166, S.E. = 144.247). 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 1 mean reaction time of responses grouped by block. Error bars represent 




 To investigate looking behaviour between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and 
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted in which number of fixations was the dependent variable.  
A main effect of block was obtained F(1,39) = 17.669, p < .001, ƞ2 = 0.300. Pairwise 
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0.265) block than in the empirical block (M = 2.415, S.E. = 0.265). There was no main effect of 
choice. There was no block by choice interaction.  
 
Figure 4. Experiment 1 mean fixation count of options grouped by block and choice. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.  
 
 Both blocks were found to be abnormally distributed with leftward skewed and 
leptokurtic distributions. Preferential trials were more skewed and leptokurtic than empirical 
trials indicating shorter overall response times and less variation in RTs across subjects.  
The preferential block in Experiment 1 resulted in longer dwell time, slower RT and 
greater number of fixations than those in the empirical block. The slower RT in the preferential 
block than in the empirical block is congruent with the findings of Shimojo and colleagues’ 2003 
findings. Recall that Shimojo and colleagues found that trials with similar attractiveness ratings 
between face pairs resulted in slower RTs than those of face pairs that had differing 
attractiveness ratings. Although the present task merely instructed participants to choose the 
correct option out of a set of equal options in the preferential task, mean RTs remained consistent 
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2270.166, S.E. = 144.247) maintained a mean RT that was consistently shorter than all RTs of 
Shimojo and colleagues’ 2003 experiment. Extending the meaning of these three variables 
following Glaholt and Reingold’s (2011) conceptualization of dwell time as selective encoding, 
fixation number as comparison, along with reaction time as a measure of processing speed, the 
preferential block resulted in longer primary selective encoding of options (DT), longer 
processing time (RT), and more comparisons made between options (Fixation Count). It is 
interesting to note that the differences in these three decision formation related variables did not 
result in gaze bias but instead, gaze was evenly distributed between options.  
Recall that Shimojo and colleagues (2003) experiment that first described the GBE 
claimed that this effect both influences and reflects the process of preference formation. In this 
experiment however, the absence of a gaze bias in both blocks suggests that subjectivity may not 
be the fundamental contributing factor to this effect. The absence of the GBE in both blocks 
might be due to the cognitive demands of this quite difficult task. To assess whether the GBE 
would arise in a simpler task, we turn to Experiment 2.  
 
Experiment 2 
Dwell Time Analysis 
To investigate possible gaze bias between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and 
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted in which proportional dwell time (as a percentage) was the dependent variable. A 
main effect of block was obtained F (1, 39) = 10.026, p = .003, ƞ2 = 0.014. Longer dwell time 
was shown in the preferential block (M = 0.440, S.E. = 0.006) than in the empirical block (M = 
0.427, S.E. = 0.006).  
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A main effect of choice was obtained F (1, 39) = 58.700, p < .001, ƞ2 = 0.363. Chosen items 
resulted in a longer dwell time (MCHOSEN = 0.466, S.E. = 0.007) than unchosen (MUNCHOSEN = 
0.401, S.E. = .007). There was no block by choice interaction. 
Paired T-test analyses between choice in both blocks was conducted. Shapiro-Wilk tests of 
normality revealed a normally distributed sample in the preferential block W (39) = .955, p = 
0.116 but a significant deviation from normality in the empirical block W (39) = 0.790, p < 
0.001. Therefore, Signed-Rank Wilcoxon tests were conducted. These tests revealed differences 
between chosen and unchosen options in both preferential, t (39) = 3.717, p < 0.001, and 
empirical, t (39) = 6.552, p < 0.001 blocks. The gaze bias was larger in the empirical block 
(MCHOSEN = 0.467, S.E. = 0.012; MUNCHOSEN = 0.387, S.E. = 0.007) than in the preferential block 
(MCHOSEN = 0.464, S.E. = 0.007; MUNCHOSEN = 0.416, S.E. = 0.010).  
 
Figure 5. Experiment 2 mean proportional dwell time of responses grouped by block and choice. 
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RT Analysis 
 A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was conducted and revealed that the sample was normally 
distributed in preferential, W(340) = 0.974, p = .463 but not in empirical, W(40) = 0.936, p = 
0.025 trials. Empirical trials had a skewness of 0.58 (S.E. = 0.37) and a kurtosis of -0.73 (S.E. 
0.73). Preferential trials had a skewness of 0.46 (S.E. = 0.37) and a kurtosis of 0.16 (S.E. 0.73). 
A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was conducted Z = 92.00, p < .001, which indicated that the RT 
was longer in the preferential block (M = 3664.463, S.E. = 358.834) than in the empirical block 
(M = 2270.166, S.E. = 144.247). The preferential block (M = 2367.873, S.E. = 123.418) was 
shown to have a longer reaction time than the empirical block (M = 1901.402, S.E. = 104.645). 
 
 
Figure 6. Experiment 2 mean response time of responses grouped by block. Error bars represent 
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Fixation Analysis 
 To investigate looking behaviour between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and 
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted in which number of fixations was the dependent variable.  
A main effect of block was obtained F(1,39) = 17.607, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.208. Pairwise 
comparisons indicate a greater frequency of fixations in the preferential (M = 3.200, S.E. = 
0.150) block than in the empirical block (M = 2.679, S.E. = 0.150). A main effect of choice was 
obtained F(1,39) = 21.769, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.066. Pairwise comparisons indicate a greater 
frequency of fixations towards chosen options (M = 3.086, S.E. = 0.140) than unchosen options 
(M = 2.793, S.E. = 0.140). There was no block by choice interaction effect.  
 
Figure 7. Experiment 2 mean fixation count of options grouped by block and choice. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. 
 
 Although preferential trials were normally distributed, the distribution was slightly 
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greater left skew and a platykurtic distribution plot, indicating shorter overall reactions times and 
greater variation in RTs across subjects.   
Similar to Experiment 1, mean dwell time differed by block, dwell times in the 
preferential block were longer than those in the empirical block. In contrast, both blocks resulted 
in a clear gaze bias towards chosen items. In addition, the empirical block resulted in a longer 
gaze bias than that of the preferential block, which directly challenges the originating assumption 
that gaze bias reflects preference formation. While the GBE may be related to preference 
formation, it appears this effect may also have a role in objective, scored decision formation.  
An interesting outcome of the two experiments was the revelation that the easier task 
produced a larger GBE than the more difficult task. This finding is consistent with observations 
that implicit eye effects such as pupil dilation vary as a function of task difficulty (van der Wel & 
van Steenbergen, 2018). Additionally, an absence of the GBE in dislike tasks (Schotter, Berry, 
McKenzie, & Rayner, 2010) was used to support the idea that gaze bias as a reflection of 
preference formation but it might be the case that it was increased task difficulty instead. 
Preference and dislike tasks are not only different in choice response, they may also differ in 
difficulty level/cognitive load. For instance, one requires greater cognitive processing to decide 
which item is liked and then to switch choices to the other item to complete a dislike task trial.  
 RT analysis of the two experiments were similar in that the preferential blocks had longer 
RTs than empirical blocks in both. Fixation analyses was also similar in that preferential blocks 
showed greater mean number of fixations. However, these differences require direct statistical 
analysis across studies 1 and 2. 
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Experiments 1 & 2 Analysis 
Dwell Time Analysis 
To compare mean dwell times between studies 1 and 2, a 2X2X2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA by experiment (2 factors: 1, 2), block (2 factors: empirical, preferential) and choice (2 
factors: chosen, unchosen) of proportional dwell time was conducted. A main effect of 
experiment was obtained, F(1,39) = 6.006, p = 0.019, ƞ2 = 0.029. Pairwise comparisons revealed 
longer dwell times in Experiment 2 (M = 0.434, S.E. = 0.005) than Experiment 1 (M = 0.416, 
S.E. = 0.005). A main effect of block was obtained, F(1,39) = 15.512, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.013. 
Pairwise comparisons indicate longer mean dwell time in the preferential blocks (M = 0.431, S.E. 
= 0.004) than empirical blocks (M = 0.419, S.E. = 0.004). A main effect of choice was obtained, 
F(1,39) = 41.698, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.125 with chosen being longer than unchosen (M = 0.443, S.E. 
= 0.007) than unchosen options (M = 0.406, S.E. = 0.007). 
An interaction between experiment and choice was obtained, F(1,39) = 23.291, p < 
0.001, ƞ2 = 0.071. Simple main effects revealed that experiment had an effect on the mean dwell 
time of chosen options, F(1,39) = 24.575, p < 0.001, but no effect on mean dwell time of 
unchosen options. Pairwise comparisons between chosen items in each experiment revealed 
Experiment 2 had longer mean dwell times of chosen options (MCHOSEN = 0.466, S.E. = 0.007) 
than those of Experiment 1 (MCHOSEN = 0.420, S.E. = 0.007). 
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Figure 11. Experiments 1 & 2 mean proportional dwell time of responses grouped by block and 
choice. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 
RT Analysis 
 To compare mean reaction time (in milliseconds) between studies, a 2X2 repeated-
measures ANOVA by experiment (2 factors: 1,2) and block (2 factors: empirical, preferential) 
was conducted. A main effect of experiment was obtained, F(1,39) = 10.180, p = 0.003, ƞ2 = 
0.106. Pairwise comparisons indicate longer mean RTs in Experiment 1 (M = 2967.314, S.E. = 
174.834) than in Experiment 2 (M = 2134.637, S.E. = 174.834). 
A main effect of block was obtained, F(1,39) = 28.350, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.133. Pairwise 
comparisons indicate that the preferential block showed nearly 1000 ms longer mean RT (M = 
3016.168, S.E. = 145.508) than those in the empirical block (M = 2085.784, S.E. = 145.508). 
An interaction effect between experiment and block was obtained, F(1,39) = 9.277, p = 0.004, ƞ2 
= 0.033. Simple main effects analysis revealed preferential block RT differed between 
Experiment 1 (M = 3664.643, S.E. = 209.614) and Experiment 2 (M = 2367.873, S.E. = 
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Figure 12. Experiments 1 & 2 mean response time of responses grouped by block. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.  
 
Fixation Analysis 
 To compare looking behaviour between experiments, a 2X2X2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA by experiment (2 factors: Experiment 1, Experiment 2), block (2 factors: Empirical, 
Preferential), and choice (2 factors: Chosen, Unchosen) was conducted using mean number of 
fixations as the dependent variable. A main effect of block was found F(1,39) = 27.344, p < 
0.001, ƞ2 = 0.131. Pairwise comparisons indicate that the preferential blocks (M = 3.464, S.E. = 
0.147) resulted in a greater mean number of fixations than in the empirical blocks (M = 2.547, 
S.E. = 0.147). A main effect of choice was obtained, F(1,39) = 15.971, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.005. 
Pairwise comparisons indicate that there was a greater mean number of fixations towards the 
chosen options (M = 3.090, S.E. = 0.120) than the unchosen options (M = 2.920, S.E. = 0.120). 
Although there was no main effect of experiment, an experiment by block interaction was 
obtained F(1,39) = 6.099, p = 0.018, ƞ2 = 0.025. Simple main effects analysis indicated that 
Experiment 1 had an effect on blocks, F(1,39) = 17.669, p < 0.001. Preferential block resulted in 
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Experiment 2 also had an effect on blocks, F(1,39) = 17.607, p < 0.001. Again, preferential 
blocks resulted in more fixations (M = 3.200, S.E. = 0.216) than empirical blocks (M = 2.679, 
S.E. = 0.216). 
Additionally, an experiment by choice interaction effect was obtained, F(1,39) = 12.088, 
p = 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.002. Simple main effects analysis indicated that Experiment 2 had an effect on 
choice F(1,39) = 21.769, p < 0.001, and Experiment 1 had no effect on choice. Chosen options 
resulted in more fixations (M = 3.086, S.E. = 0.182) than unchosen options (M = 2.793, S.E. = 
0.182) in Experiment 2.   
 
Figure 13. Experiments 1 & 2 mean fixation count of options grouped by block and choice. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 The preceding analysis compared the results of two experiments to determine 
whether task demands could explain differences in GBE in the two experiments. Although 
such comparisons would typically be done within a single experiment, the analysis is not 
without merit. Importantly the participants for both experiments were drawn from the 
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differences. Nonetheless a caveat preceding this discussion is warranted – this between-
experiment comparison is a weakness in the design that arose; it was only after data from 
both studies were analyzed that the differences between the two and the possible 
explanation was revealed. 
 Experiment 2 resulted in longer overall dwell time (42%) than Experiment 1 (41%). By 
block, preferential trials had longer DT (43%) than empirical trials (41%), and by choice, the 
chosen items resulted in a longer DT (44%) than the unchosen options (40%). The Experiment 
by Choice interaction reveals that Experiment 2 had longer allocated gaze towards chosen 
options, and that unchosen options were not affected by experiment. Mean DT of chosen options 
in Experiment 2 were longer (46%) than in Experiment 1 (42%). These results, taken together 
with previous results that revealed a strong gaze bias in Experiment 2 and an absence of this 
effect in Experiment 1, suggest that gaze towards the chosen option determines the presence of a 
gaze bias. In other words, unchosen items were not affected by this interaction effect and 
therefore participant gaze towards unchosen items was not decreased, rather their gaze towards 
the chosen items was increased.  
 With a difference of 833ms RTs for Experiment 1 (2,967ms) results were substantially 
longer than those of Experiment 2 (2,134ms). By block, there was a 931ms processing speed 
disadvantage for preferential trials (3,016ms) as compared to empirical trials (2,085ms). When 
considered with the accuracy data this indicates that Experiment 1 was more difficult than 
Experiment 2. This indicates that rather than a strategy-shift (that would have shown up as a 
speed-accuracy tradeoff) the RT in the preferential trials were affected by experiment, but 
empirical trials were not.  
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 Finally, the analysis of number of fixations indicated that there was no difference across 
studies, but there was a difference across blocks and across choice options. An increased number 
of fixations in the preferential block is congruent with co-occurring longer RTs, and an increased 
number of fixations in chosen options than unchosen is congruent with the longer overall 
proportion of dwell time in chosen items.  
Experiment 3 
Dwell Time Analysis 
To investigate possible gaze bias between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and 
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted in which proportional dwell time (as a percentage) was the dependent variable. A 
main effect of block was obtained F(1,38) = 4.276, p = .046, ƞ2 = 0.026 in which the gender 
biased block resulted in a longer proportion of dwell time (M = 0.435, S.E. = 0.007) than the 
neutral block (M = 0.424, S.E. = 0.007).  
The gendered block resulted in equal dwell times of chosen (M = 0.431, S.E. = 0.008) and 
unchosen (M = 0.439, S.E. = 0.008) options and the neutral block resulted in the same (MCHOSEN 
= 0.426, S.E. = 0.008; MUNCHOSEN = 0.422, S.E. = 0.008), there was no main effect of choice. 
There was no block by choice interaction effect.  
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Figure 8. Experiment 3 mean proportional dwell time of responses grouped by block and choice. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 
RT Analysis 
 A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was conducted, concluding that the dataset is not normally 
distributed in both biased, W(39) = 0.856, p < 0.001, and neutral,  W(39) = 0.738, p < 0.001 . 
Biased trials had a skew of 1.85 (S.E. = 0.38) and a kurtosis of 5.21 (S.E. 0.74). Neutral trials 
had a skewness of 2.9 (S.E. = 0.38) and a kurtosis of 13.2 (S.E. 0.74). A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
test was conducted Z = 410.00, p < .788, which indicated that there was no difference in RT  
between the gender biased block (M = 2505.775, S.E. = 182.064) and the gender-neutral block 
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Figure 9. Experiment 3 mean response time of responses grouped by block. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean.  
 
Fixation Analysis 
To investigate looking behaviour between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and 
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted in which number of fixations was the dependent variable. There was no main effect of 
block between gender biased trials (M = 3.470, S.E. = 0.210) and neutral trials (M = 3.282, S.E. = 
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Figure 10. Experiment 3 mean fixation count of options grouped by block and choice. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. 
 
 
 Both blocks were skewed to the left and strongly leptokurtic in distribution, neutral trials 
were much more leptokurtic and skewed to the left than biased trials. This indicates that RTs 
tended to be shorter in the overall distributions with low variance across participants.  
The gender biased block resulted in longer proportional dwell time than the gender-
neutral block. There was no difference in dwell time between chosen and unchosen options. 
Mean RT and mean number of fixations were equal in both blocks. Taken together, the results 
suggest that eye-movement behaviour only differs slightly when two gender-opposite word pairs 
were presented in terms of selective encoding (mean dwell time proportion), but how these 
word-pairs were compared (mean number of looks) and the speed at which word pairs were 
processed and chosen (mean RT in milliseconds) did not differ. There was no effect of gaze bias 
towards any chosen option in either block. It is worth noting that a possible explanation for the 
unique difference between blocks in dwell time, despite equal results of choice gaze, RT, and 
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the white space on the computer screen in the neutral block than the gender-bias block during the 
selective encoding process. In other words, encoding two gender opposing traits/roles may 
require longer scanning, or elicit greater attention capture than encoding two neutral trait/roles 
word pairs. In contrast, comparing and choosing between gender-biased and gender-neutral 
words are not distinct in the decision process.  
 
General Discussion 
The gaze bias effect has emerged from preferential decision-making of faces (Shimojo, 
Simion, Shimojo & Scheier, 2003) and has been tested from option sets of 2 to 8 (Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2009a), dislike tasks (Schotter, Berry, McKenzie, & Rayner, 2010; Shimojo et al., 
2003), judgements of products/brightness of images (Onuma, Penwannakul, Fuchimoto, & 
Sakai, 2017), image recency/landscape images (Schotter, Berry, McKenzie, & Rayner, 2010) and 
novel subject matter (i.e. Fourier Transform) (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo & Scheier, 2003). 
However, testing of the gaze bias effect in scored, rule-based decision processes had yet to be 
examined. Additionally, the presence of this effect in stimuli such as weighted features, 
mathematical and linguistic combinations was unknown.  
The major objective of this project was to describe the behavioural differences between 
preferential and empirical decision making. To do this, both decision types were completed by 
each participant, in which selective encoding, comparison stage, gaze bias, and processing speed 
were contrasted between blocks. In extending the analysis, separate stimulus sets were used to 
consider variations of decision making across feature, number and linguistic comparisons.  
 The first metric of interest was gaze bias effect and whether it could be replicated in a 
non-preference task that involves the goal of choosing an objectively correct option in a scored 
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task. Evidence of the GBE would challenge Shimojo and colleagues (2003) gaze cascade 
hypothesis which relied heavily on the concepts of preferential looking compounding over time 
and resulting in a disproportionate amount of time spent looking at the chosen item. In 
Experiment 2, when participants chose between two math sum option sets, the gaze bias is not 
only present in both empirical and preferential blocks, but the GBE is strongest in the empirical 
block. In other words, when participants were comparing a correct option and an incorrect 
option, they gazed longer at the chosen option than when they were comparing two equal 
options. This supports the counter argument that the GBE can be independent of preference since 
the task goal of accuracy guided the visual decision-making process. Further, the complete 
absence of the effect in Experiment 1 in which decision is guided by colour, line and shape 
“inequalities” suggests that certain features of visual decision making interfere with eye 
movement during decision. Extending this finding further to Experiment 3, there was an absence 
of the gaze bias effect as well when decisions were made between words. Subject-matter may 
therefore dictate the extent to which a gaze bias effect exists (e.g., visual versus verbal stimuli).  
Secondly, the dwell or fixation number analyses measured how options were being 
compared. A greater degree of comparison occurred in preferential blocks overall, which is 
expected since there is a “cue” (correct option) present in the empirical block but absent in the 
preferential block that would terminate the comparison stage. When including choice as a 
variable, there was a greater number of fixations allocated towards the chosen options than the 
unchosen options overall, and this effect was greatest in Experiment 2. This is congruent with the 
previous finding of a gaze bias effect in Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 1. When 
considering Shimojo & colleagues’ (2003) positive feedback loop, it is worth noting that a larger 
comparison stage of decision appears to occur in the preferential block, which could contribute 
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to a “loop” of comparing options and choosing the most frequently looked at item. However, the 
lack of a gaze bias effect (in terms of gaze duration) in Experiment 1 conflicts with this possible 
explanation. It is important to recall that Shimojo & colleagues’ (2003) gaze bias effect was 
modeled as a probabilistic effect of there being an exponentially increasing chance of gaze 
towards the chosen item. Since this model involves both gaze duration and number of fixations, 
future research of the gaze bias effect should measure both variables separately when testing 
whether the effect is present. Experiment 1 shows a lack of gaze bias at both levels (gaze 
duration, number of fixations) and Experiment 2 shows the presence of the effect at both levels.  
Recall that reaction time from stimulus onset to response action is defined as the speed of 
processing over an entire trial. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the preferential block resulted in 
longer processing speeds than empirical block trials, a difference of over 1 second (1394ms) in 
Experiment 1 and just under half a second (466ms) in Experiment 2. Such a large disparity 
between the two studies may have been due to the greater difficulty in the first experiment than 
in the second experiment, and this is reflected by the accuracy scores. Regardless, the shorter 
processing speeds in the empirical blocks suggest that it takes less time to process a response 
between a correct/incorrect option pair than an equal option pair.  
Finally, Experiment 3 was meant to test whether a linguistic decision task would mirror 
the results of either Experiment 1 or 2, and if the behaviour in choosing between gender-
stereotypical and non-stereotypical words would be similar to the preferential/empirical blocks. 
Interestingly, only the selective encoding stage was different between blocks, in which the 
gender-biased block (43.5%) resulted in longer dwell times than the neutral block (42.5%). 
These values were most similar to Experiment 2’s preferential block (44.0%) and empirical 
block (42.7%). However, this was the only similarity found. There was no gaze bias effect 
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towards any option, processing speed was equal (between 2489-2505ms) and the mean number 
of fixations was just over 3 in each block. These results indicate that gender-stereotyped words 
are selectively encoded for a longer duration then gender-neutral words, but both options are 
looked at equally, each option set is compared in the same way, and the time is takes to process 
and choose an item is equal. The results of this study may reflect limitations of studying 
language from a decision-making perspective. Perhaps the contextual differences of Experiment 
3, such as including a sentence prime and both blocks differing by gender rather than 
empirical/preferential differences, led to similar comparisons and responses. The finding that 
masculine-feminine word pairs had longer overall dwell times than neutral-neutral word pairs 
suggests that gendered words may carry more “meaning” which require longer encoding than 
neutral traits/roles, all other variables being equal. More research needs to be done on the 
sentence prime task to observe a possible difference in visual decision strategy between types of 
words. For example, words that are opposites on emotional-valence scales may result in different 
eye-movement/choice results than emotionally neutral words.  
To summarize, this study examined multiple factors of visual decision including gaze 
bias, selective encoding, comparison, processing speed and response in an effort to characterize 
decision behaviours as implicit strategies. Although more work is required to fully support the 
development of a full model of decision making and gaze bias across domains this study 
highlights the promise of cross modal investigations. This study serves as an example of how 
complex and multifactored visual decision-making can be investigated to provide data to inform 
such a model. 
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Appendix A 
Experiment 1 Trial Examples 
 
Figure 1. Trial example of Experiment 1 Feature Inequality Task. Pre-trial rules precede subject 
button press and 500ms fixation cross and 2-AFC trial screen. Unambiguous block 
represents empirical block with correct (green circle) and incorrect (horizontal-lined 
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Appendix B 
Experiment 2 Trial Examples 
 
 
Figure 2. Trial example of Experiment 2 Math Inequality Task. 500ms fixation cross precedes 2-
AFC trial screen. Unambiguous block represents empirical block with correct (2+6) and 
incorrect (3+4) option pair. Ambiguous block represents 2 equal option pair relative to 
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Appendix C 
Experiment 3 Trial Examples 
 
Figure 3. Trial example of Experiment 3 Trait/Role Stereotype Task. Gendered sentence stem 
precedes 500ms fixation cross and 2-AFC trial screen. Unambiguous block represents 
empirical block with masculine (mechanic) and feminine (Nurse) option pair. Ambiguous 
block represents 2 gender-neutral option pair. 
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Appendix D 
Data Analysis Outputs 
Experiment 1 Dwell Time 
Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Within Participants Effects  
Cases  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  η²  
Block  0.005  1  0.005  5.413  0.025  0.022  
Residuals  0.035  39  9.079e -4        
Choice  0.003  1  0.003  1.325  0.257  0.015  
Residuals  0.094  39  0.002        
Block ✻ Choice  5.583e -6  1  5.583e -6  0.003  0.959  2.550e -5  
Residuals  0.082  39  0.002        
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
 
Descriptives  
Block Choice Mean SD N 
Empirical  Chosen  0.415  0.039  40  
  Unchosen  0.406  0.039  40  
Preferential  Chosen  0.426  0.045  40  
  Unchosen  0.417  0.057  40  
 
Marginal Means 
Marginal Means - Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Block Marginal Mean Lower Upper SE 
Empirical  0.410  0.401  0.420  0.005  
Preferential  0.421  0.412  0.431  0.005  
 
Experiment 1 RT 
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Paired Samples T-Test  
Measure 1  Measure 2 Test Statistic df p Effect Size 
Exp  -  Pref  Student  -4.427  39  < .001  -0.700  
      Wilcoxon  104.000    < .001  -0.746  
Note. For the Student t-test, effect size is given by Cohen's d. For the Wilcoxon test, effect size is given 
by the matched rank biserial correlation.  
 
Assumption Checks 
Descriptive Statistics  
   Exp  Pref  
Valid   40   40   
Missing   0   0   
Mean   2270.166   3664.463   
Std. Deviation   912.301   2269.466   
Skewness   1.130   2.016   
Std. Error of Skewness   0.374   0.374   
Kurtosis   0.843   4.331   
Std. Error of Kurtosis   0.733   0.733   
Shapiro-Wilk   0.899   0.783   
P-value of Shapiro-Wilk   0.002   < .001   
Minimum   1000.249   1369.110   




 N Mean SD SE 
Exp  40  2270.166  912.301  144.247  




Experiment 1 Number of Fixations 
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Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Within Participants Effects  
Cases Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p η² 
Block  68.948  1  68.948  17.669  < .001  0.300  
Residuals  152.184  39  3.902        
Choice  0.085  1  0.085  0.965  0.332  3.684e -4  
Residuals  3.417  39  0.088        
Block ✻ Choice  0.096  1  0.096  0.774  0.384  4.172e -4  
Residuals  4.828  39  0.124        
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
 
Descriptives  
Block  Choice  Mean  SD  N  
Empirical   Chosen   2.462   0.848   40   
   Unchosen   2.367   0.798   40   
Preferential   Chosen   3.726   2.195   40   
   Unchosen   3.729   2.303   40   
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Marginal Means 
Marginal Means - Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Block  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
Empirical   2.415   1.886   2.944   0.265   
Preferential   3.728   3.199   4.257   0.265   
 
 
Experiment 2 Dwell Time 
Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Within Participants Effects  
Cases Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p η² 
Block  0.006  1  0.006  10.026  0.003  0.014  
Residuals  0.024  39  6.226e -4        
Choice  0.166  1  0.166  58.700  < .001  0.363  
Residuals  0.110  39  0.003        
Block ✻ Choice  0.010  1  0.010  2.804  0.102  0.022  
Residuals  0.140  39  0.004        
Note. Type III Sum of Squares 
 
Descriptives  
Block Choice Mean SD N 
Empirical  Chosen  0.467  0.075  40  
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Descriptives  
Block Choice Mean SD N 
  Unchosen  0.387  0.043  40  
Preferential  Chosen  0.464  0.045  40  
  Unchosen  0.416  0.060  40  
  
Marginal Means 
Marginal Means - Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference  
Block Marginal Mean Lower Upper SE 
Empirical  0.427  0.414  0.440  0.006  
Preferential  0.440  0.427  0.453  0.006  
  
Marginal Means - Choice  
 95% CI for Mean Difference  
Choice Marginal Mean Lower Upper SE 
Chosen  0.466  0.451  0.481  0.007  
Unchosen  0.401  0.386  0.416  0.007  
 
Experiment 2 RT 
Paired Samples T-Test  
Measure 1  Measure 2 Test Statistic df p 
Empirical  -  Preferential  Student  -5.287  39  < .001  
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Paired Samples T-Test  
Measure 1  Measure 2 Test Statistic df p 
      Wilcoxon  92.000    < .001  
 
Assumption Checks 
Descriptive Statistics  
   Experiential  Preferential  
Valid   40   40   
Missing   0   0   
Mean   1901.402   2367.873   
Std. Deviation   661.836   780.564   
Skewness   0.581   0.464   
Std. Error of Skewness   0.374   0.374   
Kurtosis   -0.725   0.161   
Std. Error of Kurtosis   0.733   0.733   
Shapiro-Wilk   0.936   0.974   
P-value of Shapiro-Wilk   0.025   0.463   
Minimum   917.921   959.981   
Maximum   3373.173   4570.373   
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Descriptives  
  N  Mean  SD  SE  
Empirical  40  1901.402  661.836  104.645  
Preferential  40  2367.873  780.564  123.418  
  
Experiment 2 Number of Fixations 
Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Within Participants Effects  
Cases  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  η²  
Block  10.837  1  10.837  17.607  < .001  0.208  
Residuals  24.004  39  0.615        
Choice  3.454  1  3.454  21.769  < .001  0.066  
Residuals  6.188  39  0.159        
Block ✻ Choice  0.007  1  0.007  0.036  0.849  1.379e -4  
Residuals  7.692  39  0.197        
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
  
Descriptives  
Block  Choice  Mean  SD  N  
Empirical  Chosen  2.833  0.975  40  
  Unchosen  2.526  0.832  40  
Preferential  Chosen  3.340  1.112  40  
  65 
 
Descriptives  
Block  Choice  Mean  SD  N  
  Unchosen  3.060  1.037  40  
  
Marginal Means 
Marginal Means - Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Block Marginal Mean Lower Upper SE 
Empirical  2.679  2.379  2.980  0.150  
Preferential  3.200  2.899  3.500  0.150  
  
Marginal Means - Choice  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Choice Marginal Mean Lower Upper SE 
Chosen  3.086  2.804  3.369  0.140  
Unchosen  2.793  2.510  3.075  0.140  
 
Experiment 3 Dwell Time 
Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Within Participants Effects  
Cases  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  η²  
Block   0.005   1   0.005   4.276   0.046   0.026   
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Within Participants Effects  
Cases  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  η²  
Residuals   0.043   38   0.001          
Choice   1.831e -4   1   1.831e -4   0.081   0.778   9.891e -4   
Residuals   0.086   38   0.002          
Block ✻ Choice   0.002   1   0.002   1.373   0.249   0.010   
Residuals   0.049   38   0.001          
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
 
Descriptives  
Block  Choice  Mean  SD  N  
Gendered  Chosen  0.431  0.043  39  
  Unchosen  0.439  0.041  39  
Neutral  Chosen  0.426  0.052  39  
  Unchosen  0.422  0.068  39  
 
Marginal Means 
Marginal Means - Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Block  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
Gendered  0.435  0.421  0.449  0.007  
Neutral  0.424  0.410  0.438  0.007  
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Experiment 3 RT 
Paired Samples T-Test  
Measure 1    Measure 2  Test  Statistic  df  p  
Bias  -  Neutral  Student  0.190  38  0.851  
      Wilcoxon  410.000    0.788  
Assumption Checks 
Descriptive Statistics  
   Bias  Neutral  
Valid   39   39   
Missing   0   0   
Mean   2505.775   2489.531   
Std. Deviation   1136.990   1290.733   
Skewness   1.850   2.989   
Std. Error of Skewness   0.378   0.378   
Kurtosis   5.206   13.201   
Std. Error of Kurtosis   0.741   0.741   
Shapiro-Wilk   0.856   0.738   
P-value of Shapiro-Wilk   < .001   < .001   
Minimum   1037.682   1130.940   




  N  Mean  SD  SE  
Bias  39  2505.775  1136.990  182.064  
Neutral  39  2489.531  1290.733  206.683  
 
Experiment 3 Number of Fixations 
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Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Within Participants Effects  
Cases  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  η²  
Block  1.378  1  1.378  3.532  0.068  0.054  
Residuals  14.826  38  0.390        
Choice  0.001  1  0.001  0.010  0.921  5.765e -5  
Residuals  5.645  38  0.149        
Block ✻ Choice  0.001  1  0.001  0.015  0.902  5.782e -5  
Residuals  3.684  38  0.097        
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
 
Descriptives  
Block  Choice  Mean  SD  N  
Biased  Chosen  3.470  1.271  39  
  Unchosen  3.470  1.445  39  
Neutral  Chosen  3.276  1.283  39  
  Unchosen  3.289  1.329  39  
 
Experiments 1 & 2 Dwell Time 
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Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Within Participants Effects  
Cases Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p η² 
Experiment  0.025  1  0.025  6.006  0.019  0.029  
Residuals  0.163  39  0.004        
Block  0.011  1  0.011  15.512  < .001  0.013  
Residuals  0.028  39  7.166e -4        
Choice  0.108  1  0.108  41.698  < .001  0.125  
Residuals  0.101  39  0.003        
Experiment ✻ Block  3.961e -5  1  3.961e -5  0.049  0.827  4.587e -5  
Residuals  0.032  39  8.138e -4        
Experiment ✻ Choice  0.062  1  0.062  23.291  < .001  0.071  
Residuals  0.103  39  0.003        
Block ✻ Choice  0.005  1  0.005  1.911  0.175  0.006  
Residuals  0.108  39  0.003        
Experiment ✻ Block ✻ Choice  0.005  1  0.005  1.638  0.208  0.006  
Residuals  0.114  39  0.003        
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
 
Descriptives  
Experiment  Block  Choice  Mean  SD  N  
1  Empirical  Chosen  0.415  0.039  40  
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Descriptives  
Experiment  Block  Choice  Mean  SD  N  
    Unchosen  0.406  0.039  40  
  Preferential  Chosen  0.426  0.045  40  
    Unchosen  0.417  0.057  40  
2  Empirical  Chosen  0.467  0.075  40  
    Unchosen  0.387  0.043  40  
  Preferential  Chosen  0.464  0.045  40  
    Unchosen  0.416  0.060  40  
 
Marginal Means 
Marginal Means - Experiment  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Experiment  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
X1  0.416  0.405  0.426  0.005  
X2  0.434  0.423  0.444  0.005  
  
Marginal Means - Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Block  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
Empirical  0.419  0.410  0.427  0.004  
Preferential  0.431  0.422  0.439  0.004  
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Marginal Means - Choice  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Choice  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
Chosen  0.443  0.433  0.453  0.005  
Unchosen  0.406  0.397  0.416  0.005  
  
Marginal Means - Experiment ✻ Choice  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Experiment  Choice  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
X1  Chosen  0.420  0.407  0.433  0.007  
X2    0.466  0.453  0.479  0.007  
X1  Unchosen  0.411  0.398  0.425  0.007  
X2    0.401  0.388  0.415  0.007  
  
Simple Main Effects 
Simple Main Effects - Experiment  
Level of Choice  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  
Chosen  0.083  1  0.083  24.575  < .001  
Unchosen  0.004  1  0.004  1.176  0.285  
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
 
Experiments 1 & 2 RT 
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Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Within Participants Effects  
Cases  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  η²  
Experiment  2.773e +7  1  2.773e +7  10.180  0.003  0.106  
Residuals  1.063e +8  39  2.724e +6        
Block  3.462e +7  1  3.462e +7  28.350  < .001  0.133  
Residuals  4.763e +7  39  1.221e +6        
Experiment ✻ Block  8.609e +6  1  8.609e +6  9.377  0.004  0.033  
Residuals  3.580e +7  39  918035.941        
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
 
Descriptives  
Experiment Block Mean SD N 
1  Empirical  2270.166  912.301  40  
  Preferential  3664.463  2269.466  40  
2  Empirical  1901.402  661.836  40  
  Preferential  2367.873  780.564  40  
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Marginal Means 
Marginal Means - Experiment  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Experiment  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
X1  2967.314  2619.174  3315.454  174.834  
X2  2134.637  1786.497  2482.777  174.834  
  
Marginal Means - Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Block  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
Empirical  2085.784  1795.744  2375.824  145.508  
Preferential  3016.168  2726.128  3306.208  145.508  
  
Marginal Means - Experiment ✻ Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Experiment  Block  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
X1  Empirical  2270.166  1855.569  2684.763  209.614  
X2    1901.402  1486.805  2315.999  209.614  
X1  Preferential  3664.463  3249.866  4079.060  209.614  
X2    2367.873  1953.276  2782.470  209.614  
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Simple Main Effects 
Simple Main Effects - Experiment  
Level of Block  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  
Empirical  2.720e +6  1  2.720e +6  3.638  0.064  
Preferential  3.362e +7  1  3.362e +7  11.615  0.002  
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
 
Experiments 1 & 2 Number of Fixations 
Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Within Participants Effects  
Cases  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  η²  
Experiment  1.386  1  1.386  0.236  0.630  0.003  
Residuals  228.855  39  5.868        
Block  67.227  1  67.227  27.344  < .001  0.131  
Residuals  95.882  39  2.459        
Choice  2.310  1  2.310  15.971  < .001  0.005  
Residuals  5.640  39  0.145        
Experiment ✻ Block  12.558  1  12.558  6.099  0.018  0.025  
Residuals  80.306  39  2.059        
Experiment ✻ Choice  1.229  1  1.229  12.088  0.001  0.002  
Residuals  3.965  39  0.102        
Block ✻ Choice  0.078  1  0.078  0.409  0.526  1.519e -4  
Residuals  7.418  39  0.190        
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Within Participants Effects  
Cases  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  η²  
Experiment ✻ Block ✻ Choice  0.025  1  0.025  0.193  0.663  4.929e -5  
Residuals  5.101  39  0.131        
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
 
Descriptives  
Experiment  Block  Choice  Mean  SD  N  
1  Empirical  Chosen  2.462  0.848  40  
    Unchosen  2.367  0.798  40  
  Preferential  Chosen  3.726  2.195  40  
    Unchosen  3.729  2.303  40  
2  Empirical  Chosen  2.833  0.975  40  
    Unchosen  2.526  0.832  40  
  Preferential  Chosen  3.340  1.112  40  
    Unchosen  3.060  1.037  40  
  
Marginal Means 
Marginal Means - Experiment  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Experiment  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
X1  3.071  2.713  3.429  0.180  
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Marginal Means - Experiment  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Experiment  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
X2  2.940  2.581  3.298  0.180  
  
Marginal Means - Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Block  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
Empirical  2.547  2.253  2.840  0.147  
Preferential  3.464  3.170  3.757  0.147  
  
Marginal Means - Choice  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Choice  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
Chosen  3.090  2.848  3.333  0.120  
Unchosen  2.920  2.678  3.163  0.120  
  
Marginal Means - Experiment ✻ Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Experiment  Block  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
X1  Empirical  2.415  1.988  2.841  0.216  
X2    2.679  2.253  3.106  0.216  
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Marginal Means - Experiment ✻ Block  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Experiment  Block  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
X1  Preferential  3.728  3.301  4.154  0.216  
X2    3.200  2.773  3.626  0.216  
  
Marginal Means - Experiment ✻ Choice  
 95% CI for Mean Difference   
Experiment  Choice  Marginal Mean  Lower  Upper  SE  
X1  Chosen  3.094  2.732  3.456  0.182  
X2    3.086  2.724  3.449  0.182  
X1  Unchosen  3.048  2.686  3.410  0.182  
X2    2.793  2.431  3.155  0.182  
  
Simple Main Effects 
Simple Main Effects - Choice  
Level of Experiment  Sum of Squares  df  Mean Square  F  p  
1  0.085  1  0.085  0.965  0.332  
2  3.454  1  3.454  21.769  < .001  
Note. Type III Sum of Squares  
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